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Torts
TORTS-IMMUNITY

OF EMPLOYER

OF INDEPENDENT

CONTRACTOR

OF WELL FINANCED AND EXPERIENCED EMPLOYER TO
ENGAGE PROPERLY SOLVENT OR ADEQUATELY INSURED SUBCONTRACTOR IS VIOLATION OF DUTY TO OBTAIN COMPETENT INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR IN INDUSTRY IN WHICH HIGH INSURANCE COVERAGE IS

-FAILURE

MATTER OF TRADE PRACTICE.

Becker v. Interstate Properties (1977)
Appellant Gary Becker, a nineteen-year-old construction worker, was
severely injured ' while working at a shopping center project which was
owned and being developed by defendant I.P. Construction Corporation

(I.P. or developer). 2

The injury was caused by the negligent acts of an

employee of defendant Windsor Contracting Corporation (Windsor), who
3
had supplied trucks to subcontractor Wood-Pine Constructors (Wood-Pine).

Appellant, who asserted claims against Windsor, Wood-Pine, and I.P., contended that he would be unable to recover damages 4 from Windsor because
of Windsor's limited insurance coverage and marginal capitalization. 5 Appellant further alleged that the developer was negligent in employing such a
"financially-irresponsible" 6 independent contractor. 7 The district court
1. Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1204-05 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 906 (1978). Appellant was injured when a heavy truck drove squarely over his pelvis. 569
F.2d at 1205.
2. 569 F.2d at 1205. The developer is a wholly-owned corporate subsidiary of defendant
Interstate Properties, the owner of the property on which the $1.5 million shopping center was
being built. Id. at 1205 n.2.
3. Id. at 1205. The court assumed that Windsor was negligent, but the question had not
been submitted to a jury. Id. at 1214-15. Wood-Pine, a subcontractor of the developer, was
hired to pave the shopping center. Id. at 1205. Windsor, a subcontractor of Wood-Pine, was
employed to operate and utilize its own trucks in paving the shopping center. Id.
4. While the exact amount of damages sought by appellant was not specified by the appellate court, it noted that appellant's requested compensation for damages included $35,000 in
medical expenses incurred as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Id. at 1205.
5. Id. Evidence indicated that, on some previous occasions, I.P. had required its subcontractors to be insured. Id. Further evidence showed that the standard liability insurance policy
in the construction industry provided for recoveries of up to $250,000 per accident. Id. In
contrast, Windsor's automobile liability insurance policy limit was only $10,000 per accident. Id.
With respect to capitalization, Windsor's owner estimated its net worth at the time of the
accident to be "a couple of thousand dollars," since its equipment was financed wholly by
creditors. Id. at 1209 n.25.
6. Id. at 1207.
7. Id. at 1205. The trial court noted appellant's assertion that Wood-Pine would be unable
to satisfy a judgment, thus justifying impleader of the developer. Becker v. Interstate Properties, No. 74-430, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1976), rev'd, 569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). The Third Circuit adopted the alternate consideration that the
developer "knew, or should have known, that Wood-Pine would hire subcontractors, since
Wood-Pine itself had no trucks." 569 F.2d at 1205. It was also noted that the agreement beapproval of Wood-Pine's subcontracts. Id. n.3.
tween I.P. and Wood-Pine required I.P.'s
Appellant also advanced the allegations that: 1) he was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the developer and Wood-Pine requiring that Wood-Pine be insured; and 2) the
consulting engineer for the project and the architect were liable for failing to assure that all

(394)
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granted the developer's motion for summary judgment, holding that under
New Jersey law an employer could not be liable for the torts of an independent subcontractor regardless of the subcontractor's financial status.' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9 reversed, holding that
a well-financed and experienced employer violated his duty to obtain a competent independent contractor when he failed to engage a properly solvent
or adequately insured subcontractor for work in an industry in which high
insurance coverage is customary. 10 Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569
F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
1
11

Under respondeat superior, a master is liable for torts committed by
his servants within the scope of their employment. 12 The liability of an
employer for the torts of his independent contractor under this rule has long
been a disputed issue. While the earliest cases dealing with this question
held the employer liable, 13 subsequent cases generally immunized the
employer from such liability.' 4 By 1825 a general rule of employer immusubcontractors were adequately insured. Id. n.4. The trial court rejected these claims and dismissed the consulting engineer and architect as defendants. Becker v. Interstate Properties, No.
74-430, slip op. at 8, 10 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1976). The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court
regarding these claims and defendants. 569 F.2d at 1205 n.4.
8. Becker v. Interstate Properties, No. 74-430, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Sgpt. 17, 1976), rev'd,
569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). While recognizing the necessity of adequately compensating injured persons, the district court stated that a wholesale expansion of the application of the competency exception would impose a hardship on persons of
modest means and limited business experience who may hire an independent contractor.
Becker v. Interstate Properties, No. 74-430, slip op. at 6-7 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1976). The court
expressed the view that such an expansion of the competency exception should come from the
New Jersey state legislature after that body had studied the social and economic impact of such
a result. Id. slip op. at 6. See text accompanying note 45 infra.
9. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Van Dusen and Hunter. Judge Adams wrote the
majority opinion and Judge Hunter wrote a dissenting opinion.
10. Since the case below was disposed of by summary judgment, the court's inquiry was
limited to determining whether any facts reasonably inferable from the record would entitle the
plaintiff to have the case sent to the jury. 569 F.2d at 1206.
11. The term "respondeat superior" has been translated as "[lI]et the master answer."
BLACK'S LAW DIC'TIONARY 1475 (4th ed. 1968). This maxim means that a principal is liable in
certain cases for the wrongful acts of his agent. Id.
12. For a general discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior, see 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.6 (1956) (hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219 (1958).
13. The earliest case dealing with this issue was Bush v. Steinman, 126 Eng. Rep. 978 (C.P.
1799). For early American cases which followed the British trend in applying the doctrine of
respondeat superior to an employer and his independent contractor, see, e.g., Stone v. Cheshire Ry., 19 N.H. 427 (1849); Lowell v. Boston & Lowell Ry., 40 Mass. (26 Pick.) 24 (1839).
14. For cases modifying the rule of liability, see, e.g., Quarman v. Burnett, 151 Eng. Rep.
509 (1840) (limiting Bush v. Steinman to cases involving injury connected with real property
ownership); Laugher v. Pointer, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (K.B. 1826) (owner of carriage not liable for
negligence of hired driver, as he had no contract with or choice of driver). For later cases
overruling the rule of liability, see, e.g., Hilliard v. Richardson, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 349 (1855)
(rejecting Bush v. Steinman); Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48 (1851) (same); Reedie v. London &
N.W. Ry.,. 154 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1849) (same).
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nity had developed under which an employer was not liable for the contractor's negligent acts unless he engaged an independent contractor to perform
work constituting a nuisance.' 5 Nevertheless, exceptions began to evolve
soon after the rule was established.' 6 Presently, the most commonly recognized exceptions are: 1) when the employer is personally negligent; 17 2)
when a statutory or nondelegable duty exists; 18 and 3) when the work is
inherently dangerous. 19
While the Third Circuit and the New Jersey courts have generally
adhered to the doctrine of employer immunity, 20 the New Jersey courts
have adopted some of the widely recognized exceptions. In Majestic Realty

15. The reason generally given for this exception to the doctrine of respondeat superior was
that the independent contractor is generally subject to the control of his employer regarding the
result desired, but not with respect to the manner of achieving that result. See, e.g., Sword v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 824 (1958); Spinozzi v. E.J.
Lavino Co., 243 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1957). For further discussion of the independent contractor
exception to respondeat superior, see, e.g., NEW YORK LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT
628-29 (1939); W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 468; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk 1, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 595 (1929); Morris, The Torts of An Independent Contractor,
29 ILL. L. REV. 339, 343 (1934).
16. The first exception was established as early as 1853 when it was held, in Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumer Co., 118 Eng. Rep. 955, 955 (1853), that an employer was liable for the
torts of his independent contractor if the latter was employed to perform an illegal act. Id.
Many years later, Chief Justice Gallagher remarked: "[I]t would be proper to say that the rule is
now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions." Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v.
Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 502, 277 N.W. 226, 228 (1937). Dean Prosser has
commented that the "very number [of exceptions] is sufficient to cast doubt upon the validity of
the rule." W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 468.
17. An employer may be considered negligent for selecting an incompetent independent
contractor. See Huntt v. McNamee, 141 F. 293 (4th Cir. 1905). An employer may also be held
negligent by failing to exercise requisite supervision over any part of the work over which he
retains control. See, e.g., Terry v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 164 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Ark.
1958); Bergquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 134 A.2d 20, cert. denied, 25 N.J. 55, 134
A.2d 832 (1957). Finally, an employer may be personally negligent if he allows work to be done
by dangerous methods. See U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 258 F. 697 (D. Md. 1919), affd,
264 F. 66 (4th Cir. 1920).
18. See, e.g., Dixie Stage Lines v. Anderson, 22 Ala. 673, 134 So. 23 (1931) (transporter of
students held to nondelegable duty); Snyder v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285
P.2d 912 (1955) (regulations of Public Utilities Commission imposed nondelegable duty on public utility).
19. See, e.g., Garden of the Gods Village, Inc. v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286, 295 P.2d 597
(1956) (blasting); Trump v. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co., 99 W. Va. 425, 129 S.E.
309 (1929) (construction of dam).
For discussions of other exceptions, see 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 12, § 26.11, at
1405-10; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 71, at 468-74; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 410-29 (1965).
20. See Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42, 53 (3d Cir. 1963) (doctor not liable for tort of
hospital blood bank employee not shown to be other than independent contractor); Meny v.
Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 97, 77 A.2d 245, 252 (1950) (employer is not generally liable for negligence
of independent contractor); Terranella v. Union Bldg. & Constr. Co., 3 N.J. 443, 446-57, 70
A.2d 753, 754 (1950) (same); Araujo v. New Jersey Natural Gas Co., 62 N.J. Super. 88, 101, 162
A.2d 299, 305, cert. denied, 33 N.J. 329, 164 A.2d 380 (1960) (same); Gibilterra v. Rosemawr
Homes, 32 N.J. Super. 315, 319, 108 A.2d 295, 297, aff'd, 19 N.J. 166, 115 A.2d 553 (1954)
(same).
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Associates v. Toti Contracting Co., 21 the Supreme Court of New Jersey articulated those exceptions, stating that the employer would be held responsible
for the negligence of his independent contractor if: 1) the employer retains
22
control over the aspect of the activity in which the negligence occurs;
3
2) the contractor employed is incompetent; 2 or 3) the performance of the
24
Since Majestic, New
contract involves an inherently dangerous activity.
and its triparof
immunity
Jersey courts have consistently followed this rule
25
tite exceptions.
Furthermore, two New Jersey statutes 26 have imposed certain affirma27
The Construction
tive duties on employers in the construction industry.
28
requires all employers engaging in construction activities to
Safety Act
29
The
comply with the requirements of the New Jersey Construction Code.
30
carry
to
requires all contractors
Employers' Liability Insurance Law
workmen's compensation insurance, 3 1 and subjects employers to liability3 for
2
compensation if a subcontractor fails to carry the compulsory insurance.

21. 30 N.J. 425, 153 A.2d 321 (1959). In Majestic, the New Jersey Parking Authority hired
Toti Contracting Company as an independent contractor to demolish a building owned by the
Authority. Id. at 428, 153 A.2d at 322. Toti's employees negligently allowed a part of the
demolished building to collapse and damage Majestic's adjoining property. Id. at 429, 153 A.2d
at 323.
22. Id. at 431, 153 A.2d at 324.
23. Id. It has been said that liability in such a case "does not attach vicariously but because
of the wrongful'act in placing an incompetent in a position to do harm." Corleto v. Shore
Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 307, 350 A.2d 534, 537 (1975).
24. 30 N.J. at 431, 433-36, 153 A.2d at 324, 325-26.
25. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 104 N.J. Super. 436, 442, 444, 250 A.2d
408, 412-13 (1969); Csaranko v. Robilt, Inc., 93 N.J. Super. 428, 433, 226 A.2d 43, 46 (1967);
Marion v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 72 N.J. Super. 146, 153, 178 A.2d 57, 60 (1962);
Wolczak v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 64, 71, 168 A.2d 412, 415 (1961);
Araujo v. New Jersey Natural Gas Co., 62 N.J. Super. 88, 101, 162 A.2d 299, 305, cert. denied,
33 N.J. 328, 164 A.2d 380 (1960).
Three recent New Jersey cases have held against employer immunity on somewhat novel
grounds. See Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975)
(hospital may be liable for allowing incompetent doctor to use operating room, citing Majestic in
support of incompetent contractor exception); Hill v. Newman, 126 N.J. Super. 557, 316 A.2d
8, cert. denied, 64 N.J. 508, 317 A.2d 720 (1973) (suit allowed against contractee based on
contractor's apparent authority, citing Majestic for general rule); Bennett v. T&F Distrib. Co.,
117 N.J. Super. 439, 285 A.2d 59 (1971), cert. denied, 60 N.J. 350, 289 A.2d 795 (1972) (summary judgment denied to defendant contractee in assault action against independent salesman
where contractee should have known of salesman's history of violent action).
26. See Construction Safety Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5-166 to 181 (1965) (West);
Employers' Liability Insurance Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-70 to 95.3 (1959) (West).
27. The New Jersey Superior Court has recently held that the failure to comply with the
Construction Safety Code confers a right of tort action on those who are injured. See Horton v.
American Inst. for Mental Studies, 154 N.J. Super. 121, 380 A.2d 1210 (1977); Bortz v. Rammel, 151 N.J. Super. 312, 376 A.2d 1261, cert. denied, 75 N.J. 539, 384 A.2d 518 (1977).
28. N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§ 34:5-166 to 181 (1965) (West).

29. N.J.A.C. § 12:180 (1969). Compliance with the Construction Safety Code was required
to ensure the health and safety of employees and the general public. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5168 (1965) (West).
30. N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§ 34:15-70 to 95.3 (1959) (West).

31. Id. § 34:15-71.
32. Id. § 34:15-79.
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Nonetheless, the New Jersey case law does not support the proposition
that the employment of a financially irresponsible independent contractor is
tantamount to hiring an incompetent contractor. 3 3 The only reference to
this concept by the Supreme Court of New Jersey comes from the following
passage in Majestic:
Inevitably the mind turns to the fact that the injured third party is
entirely innocent and that the occasion of his injury arises out of
the desire of the contractee to have certain activities performed.
The injured has no control over or relation with the contractor.
The contractee, true, has no control over the doing of the work
and in that sense is also innocent of the wrong doing; but he does
have the power of selection and in the application of concepts of
distributive justice perhaps much can be said for the view that a
loss arising out of the tortious conduct of34a financially irresponsible
contractor should fall on the contractee.
The New Jersey courts, however, have never applied the Majestic dictum
regarding "distributive justice."35
The few cases in other jurisdictions which have directly addressed the
question of employer immunity in this context have rejected the Majestic
dictum. 36 In Coleman v. Silverberg Plumbing Co.,3 7 the California Court of
Appeals refused to hold an employer strictly liable for his failure to insist

33. See 569 F.2d at 1208. Several commentators have discussed such a rule. See, e.g., 2
& JAMES, supra note 12, at 1405; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 468. Professor Morris
has queried:
If the contractee has to look out for the interests of others by using due care to pick a
man with requisite skill to whom to entrust his enterprises, why should he not also have
to look out for the interests of others by selecting a man with sufficient financing?
Morris, supra note 15, at 344. But see Steffen, Independent Contractorand the Good Life, 2 U.
CHI. L. REV. 501, 505 (1935) (holding an employer liable for the torts of his financially irresponsible independent contractor has always been coldly received).
It has been held, however, that when a contractee knowingly selects an irresponsible contractor in order to escape liability, the contractee is liable for the contractor's torts. See, e.g.,
Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Co. v. Perkins, 147 F. 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1906) (creation of an
undercapitalized corporation to avoid liability); Nelson v. American Cement Plaster Co., 84
Kan. 797, 810, 115 P. 578, 583 (1911) (sham corporation); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 684, 795 (1922).
Cf. Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 587, 590 (1873) (employer liable if he knowingly selects a
financially irresponsible independent contractor for work which is inherently dangerous).
34. 30 N.J. at 432, 153 A.2d at 324-25.
35. See 569 F.2d at 1208 (dictum). One Superior Court of New Jersey case quoted the passage
as an authoritative exposition of the "policy considerations" upon which it based its decisions.
Bennett v. T&F Distrib. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 439, 444-45, 285 A.2d 59, 62 (1971), cert. denied, 60 N.J. 350, 289 A.2d 795 (1972). For New Jersey cases indirectly applying the dictum in
Majestic, see note 25 supra.
36. See Reid v. United States, 421 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (cursory application of
Coleman v. Silverberg Plumbing Co. as the authoritative statement of California law);
Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P,2d 698 (Alas. 1963); Coleman v. Silverberg Plumbing
Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 74, 69 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1968); Hampton v. McCord, 141 Ga. App. 97, 232
S.E.2d 582 (1977) (cursory rejection of a claim for liability under the Majestic dictum by mere
citation of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 11(g)). Coleman and Matanuska represent
the only extensive judicial discussion of this issue aside from Majestic. 569 F.2d at 1213.
37. 263 Cal. App. 2d 74, 69 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1968).
HARPER
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that his subcontractors carry workmen's compensation insurance. 38 The
California court took into account the fact that negligence was not alleged, 39
and deferred to a prior case in the same court in which the imposition of
such strict tort liability had been declared unconstitutional. 40 In Matanuska
Electric Association v. Johnson,4 1 the Supreme Court of Alaska rejected a claim
similar to that in the instant case 42 and stated that those most adversely
affected by the proposed rule would be "salaried working men and wage
earners of modest means."-43 The Alaska court also observed that an
employee of the uninsured contractor was better able than the average experienced contractee to judge the fiscal responsibility of a contractor." Both
the California and the Alaska courts concluded that a contrary result would
45
have to be mandated by the respective state legislatures.
In the instant case, the Becker court prefaced its opinion with comments concerning the duty of a federal court to be sensitive to both decided
cases and the doctrinal trends in a state's law when predicting a state court's
resolution of a novel state issue. 46 The Third Circuit then determined that
a New Jersey court would adopt the "financial irresponsibility" dictum of
47
Majestic.

38. Id. at 80, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 82, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
41. 386 P.2d 698 (Alas. 1963).
42. Id. at 704. In Matanuska, an independent contractor hired for bulldozing clearance carried only public liability insurance and not workmen's compensation insurance. Id. at 699. Since
the independent contractor was unable to respond in damages, an employee injured by a falling
tree sued the employer under the financial irresponsibility theory. Id. at 698-99.
43. Id. at 703.
44. Id. at 704.
45. 263 Cal. App. 2d at 81, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 162, 386 P.2d at 703.
46. 569 F.2d at 1205-06. When confronted with legal questions not yet decided by either
the courts or the legislature of the state in which it is sitting, the duty of a federal district court
exercising diversity jurisdiction is to ascertain how the state court would proceed under like
facts. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 (3d Cir. 1976); Knapp v. North Am.
Rockwell, 506 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1974). It has been stated that
"it becomes the duty of the [federal] court to arrive at the decision which reason dictates, with
the faith that the state courts will arrive at the same decision." Insurance Co. of N. America v.
English, 395 F.2d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 1968). The federal court is free to consider related decisions, analogies, and any reliable data tending convincingly to show what the state law is. See
Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1941). This is due to the fact that a
federal court, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is considered to be, "in effect, sitting as a
state court." Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). Also, since a state
court enjoys some latitude of discretion in ascertaining the law applicable to a particular dispute, to require a federal court to relinguish this discretion would place the federal court in a
position considerably inferior to that of the state court. See Moore v. Illinois Cent. By. 312 U.S.
630, 633 (1940). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 267-71 (3d ed. 1976);
IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.309, at 3112-34 (2d ed. 1974).
47. 569 F.2d at 1214. See text accompanying note 34 supra. Since the trial court had
granted defendant developer's motion for summary judgment, the Third Circuit's inquiry was
limited to the legal question of the existence of a duty between appellant and developer. 569
F.2d at 1206.
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The Becker court initially conceded that this dictum had been characterized by the Majestic court as "an incidental comment" 48 on an issue that it
had expressly reserved. 49 It further acknowledged that no New Jersey court
had ever directly applied the rule. 50 Discussing New Jersey's position as a
leader in changing tort law, 51 however, the court stated that three policy
goals of New Jersey tort law impelled its decision to hold the employer
52
responsible.
The first of these policy reasons concerned shifting the burden of accidental loss to the one best able to bear and distribute that loss. 53 The court

48. 569 F.2d at 1207, quoting Majestic Realty Assocs. v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425,
432, 153 A.2d 321, 324 (1959).
49. 569 F.2d at 1208. Although the Majestic court stated that the imposition of liability
under such circumstances was appropriate in light of the readily available insurance, which was
viewed as a normal cost of doing business in the construction industry, that court nevertheless
refused to rule on the issue, as the question had not been raised in appellate briefs or at trial.
30 N.J. at 433, 153 A.2d at 325.
50. 569 F.2d at 1208. The court observed, however, that the subsequent treatment afforded
Majestic would warrant the conclusion that New Jersey does not have an established rule of
employer immunity. Id. See note 25 supra. Furthermore, referring to the discussion of Majestic
by the Superior Court of New Jersey in Bennett v. T&F Distrib. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 439, 285
A.2d 59 (1971), cert. denied, 60 N.J. 350, 289 A.2d 795 (1972), the Third Circuit concluded that
a "New Jersey court of state-wide jurisdiction" regarded the dictum as "persuasive." 569 F.2d at
1208. See note 35 supra.
The Majestic court's financial irresponsibility dictum did, however, evoke a flurry of favorable commentary. See Cowan, Reform in the Law of Torts, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 356, 369-70
(1960); Morris, Agency and Partnership, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 375, 378-79 (1960); Note, 9
CATH. U.L. REV. 106, 107 (1960). But see Comment, Should Financial Irresponsibility Theory
Become a Reality?, 64 DICK. L. REV. 304 (1960) (questioning advisability of another exception
to the "fault" principle). It is particularly interesting that a New Jersey law review responded
with overwhelming favor to the Majestic dictum. See Morris, supra.
51. It has been recognized that New Jersey courts, utilizing a flexible approach with respect
to tort law principles, have been in the vanguard of increasing tort liability. See 569 F.2d at
1209. See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 487, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) (common law
requires that a rule of law be scrutinized each time it is applied to ascertain whether changing
conditions have not made its application an injustice); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary,
27 N.J. 29, 42, 141 A.2d 276, 283 (1958) (rule of stare decisis is limited in tort law); Linn v.
Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 218, 356 A.2d 15, 18-19 (1976) (justice requires reexamination of
common law doctrines in light of modern day needs).
52. 569 F.2d at 1209. The court was also influenced by the youthfulness of the appellant and
the seriousness of his injuries, for which revovery would be nominal from the effectively judgment proof subcontractor. Id. at 1209, 1214.
53. Id. at 1209. In support of this proposition, the court cited inter alia, Cintrone v. Hertz
Trck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 212 A.2d 769, 775 (1965) (a warranty of fitness
is implied in an auto leasing agreement because one party is in a better position to distribute
the losses that might occur); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 87, 207 A.2d 314, 323
(1965) (builder-vendor in better position to absorb losses caused by faulty construction); Collopy
v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 34, 141 A.2d 276, 282 (1958) (compensation to
innocent victims and distribution of losses is justification of vicarious liability). 569 F.2d at
1209-10 nn.28-30.
For a discussion of how distribution of loss operates in business, see generally Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Tort, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-34 (1961).
For articles advocating that the employer is the best distributor of losses, see Calabresi,
supra, at 543-47; Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1222, 1247 (1940).
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stressed that the developer was in the better position to bear the loss, being
a "substantial entrepreneur" in an industry whose members routinely carried
54
large liability insurance.
The second recognized policy of New Jersey tort law on which the court
relied was that, where feasible, liability for an accident should be allocated
to those in the position to control the factors leading to such an accident. 55
The court reasoned that although the developer may not have been able to
control the subcontractor's negligent conduct, it was in an excellent position

For articles advocating that the independent contractor is the best distributor of losses, see
Smith, Frolic & Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 461 (1923) (as entrepeneur, independent
contractor is best able to distribute loss) [hereinafter cited as Frolic & Detour]; Steffen, supra
note 33, at 518 (independent contractor is better able to absorb loss); Comment, supra note 50,
at 31 (employer does not necessarily have the deeper pocket).
Regarding the contention that neither the independent contractor nor his employer is the
better distributor of loss, see Douglas, supra note 15, at 601; Note, Risk Administration in the
Marketplace:A Reappraisal of the Independent Contractor Rule, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 672
(1973).
54. 569 F.2d at 1210-11. When the doctrine of employer immunity was first formulated,
insurance was not extensively utilized. However, with the advent of widespread insurance
coverage, the New Jersey courts have shown sensitivity to the impact of the availability of
insurance upon the rationales for common law immunities in other areas of tort law. See, e.g.,
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) (emphasizing the existence of
widespread motor vehicle insurance coverage in decision eliminating interspousal immunity);
Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 40, 141 A.2d 276, 282 (1958) (availability
of insurance is factor in trend toward rejection of interspousal immunity); Hall, Contractors'
Liability Insurance For Property Damage Incidental to Normal Operations-The Standard
Coverage Problem, 16 KAN. L. REV. 181, 181-82 (1968) (standard liability insurance in the
construction industry emerged in 1930's).
55. 569 F.2d at 1211. The court cited the following cases in support of this proposition:
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 212 A.2d 769, 775 (1965)
(warranty implied because lessor is in better position to know and control the condition of the
chattel); Santor v. A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965) (strict
liability imposed because purchasers have no knowledge or opportunity to determine quality of
articles bought); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 488, 356 A.2d 458, 467-68
(1976) (successor of manufacturer in better position to gauge risks); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J.
Super. 228, 232-35, 227 A.2d 539, 542-43 (1967) (strict liability applicable where defendant
either created the danger or is in better position to control or discover defect). 569 F.2d at 1211
n.33.
Professor Douglas (later Justice Douglas) contended that while the independent contractor
generally "stands in no better position than [the employer] to avoid, shift, or distribute the
risks, he does seem to occupy a more strategic position to prevent them." Douglas, supra note
15, at 602. Professor Harper disagrees with the view taken by Douglas and also with the importance of accident prevention in the law of torts. He has stated:
The difficulty with this reasoning is that behind it is the assumption that the social
policy of the law of Negligence is largely to admonish the defendant, in the hope that he
and others will be discouraged from similar conduct in the future. At this point the law is
supposed to perform a prophylactic or preventive function. But this assumption seems
hardly consistent with experience. The law of Negligence, it is submitted, is largely an ex
post facto determination of which of two parties shall bear a loss. The judicial process in
Negligence cases is very largely one of distribution of loss already accrued rather than an
attempt to establish a standard of conduct to which others are expected to conform. It is a
distribution of loss rather than a prevention of risk.
Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of An Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J.
494, 498 (1935).
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to control the subcontractor's financial responsibility through its contract
6
negotiations. 5
The third policy consideration involved the allocation of costs of accidents to beneficiaries of the activities giving rise to possible accidents. 57 The
court noted that by hiring a financially irresponsible subcontractor, an
employer benefits from the lower operating costs in the form of reduced
prices generally charged by a subcontractor with lower insurance premiums.

58

After enunciating the above policy considerations, the Becker court discussed the New Jersey Construction Safety Act 59 and the Employers' Liability Insurance Law,60 and determined that this legislation did not preclude
the Third Circuit from following the Majestic dictum. 6 ' The majority also

56. 569 F.2d at 1211. For further discussion of this rationale, see Note, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
232 (1932). Contra, Comment, supra note 50, at 308 (the pertinent question is whether an
employer has a choice of preventing injury, and not whether an employer has the choice of
hiring a financially competent contractor). See also Morris, supra note 15, at 344 (employer's
requiring the contractor to furnish indemnity bond is fool proof method of assuring that contractor will meet all tort obligations).
57. 569 F.2d at 1212. In support of this policy, the court cited: 1) Santor v. A.&M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965) (costs of injuries should be borne
by those who placed defective goods on the market); and 2) Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44
N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965) (same burden applicable to a mass developer). 569 F.2d at
1212 n.38.
Professors Harper and James adopt the following position: "[T]he chief warrant for vicarious
liability must be found in the principle that an enterprise (and its beneficiaries) should pay for
the losses caused by the risks which it creates (even without its fault)." 2 HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 12, at 1400. For further support of this policy, see W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at
468; Calabresi, supra note 53, at 500-07; Smith, supra note 53, at 1247; Note, supra note 56, at
233; Note, Borrowed Servants and the Theory of Enterprise Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 807, 813-15
(1967).
58. 569 F.2d at 1212. See Cowan, supra note 50, at 369 (in close bidding the cost of insurance premiums may be decisive); Morris, supra note 15, at 345 (judgment proof contractors
have competitive advantage over solvent contractors). See also Note, supra note 53, at 676
(judgment proof contractors have competitive advantage over solvent contractors).
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5-166 to 181 (1965) (West). For a discussion of this act, see notes
27-29 and accompanying text supra.
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-70 to 95.3 (1959) (West). For a discussion of this act, see text
accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
61. 569 F.2d at 1212. The Becker court stated that the legislative intent of the Construction
Safety Act (Act) does not preclude direct application of the Majestic dictum in this instance. id.
Furthermore, a New Jersey court has stated the following with respect to the general employer
iijimunity doctrine and the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act: "We do not view
the provisions of the Safety Code relied upon as establishing an additional exception to the
employer immunity doctrine." Czaranko v. Robilt, Inc., 93 N.J. Super. 428, 433, 226 A.2d 43,
46 (1967). The Becker court further noted that the Act expressly leaves the common law unaltered. 569 F.2d at 1212. One section of the Act provides that: "This act shall not in any way
increase the burden of care ordinarily imposed by the common law of the State upon those
within its jurisdiction." N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5-177 (1965) (West).
The Third Circuit interpreted the Employers' Liability Insurance Law as very much in
keeping with the Majestic dictum, since it expressed a concern on the part of the legislature to
reimburse victims injured by financially irresponsible contractors. 569 F.2d at 1212. As that
provision was adopted long before the 1938 revision of the statute, the court did not view it as a
legislative reaction to the position taken in Majestic in 1959. Id. But see note 66 and accompanying text infra.
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concluded, in light of the above policy considerations, that "cases from other
jurisdictions rejecting [the Majestic reasoning] would appear to be neither
dispositive nor even persuasive." 2
In his dissent, Judge Hunter argued that the New Jersey courts would
be reluctant to adopt the Majestic dictum and impose such a duty on
employers of independent contractors.6 3 He also expressed concern over
the "inexactitude of the standard" of liability,6 4 the scope of which was defined in terms of an individual's financial capabilities. 6 5 Judge Hunter's
basic disagreement with the majority, however, arose from his preference to
66
defer the matter to the New Jersey legislature.

62. 569 F.2d at 1213. The Becker court carefully distinguished Coleman and Matanuska.
For a discussion of Coleman and Matanuska, see notes 37-45 and accompanying text supra. The
Becker court distinguished Coleman by noting that negligence was not alleged in Coleman but
was alleged by appellant Becker. 569 F.2d at 1213. The Becker court further pointed to the
Coleman court's reliance on a 1918 California case that had declared such tort liability unconstitutional. Id. Matanuska was distinguished by the Third Circuit on the grounds that the
Matanuska court had assumed that any liability rule based on the financial irresponsibility of the
subcontractor would apply to all independent contractors, while the Becker court made no such
assumption and adopted a narrow rule. Id. at 1213-14. The Third Circuit further distinguished
Matanuska by noting that the injured employee of the uninsured subcontractor was considered
by the Alaska Supreme Court to be in a better position to evaluate the contractor's financial
status than was Becker. Id. at 1214.
The court, in limiting its holding, dispels the fears of many commentators that abolition of
employer immunity would injure the vast numbers of individuals and businesses that frequently
utilize the services of independent contractors without any thought of liability for their acts.
Professors Harper and James described the situation as follows: "The passengers in a bus are for
the time being employers of the independent contractor bus company. Consider the implications of possible vicarious liability here for injury to a pedestrian." 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 12, at 1403-04. Excluding such classes from any employer liability has been popularly
advanced. See Morris, supra note 15, at 346-47; Morris, supra note 50, at 379.
The majority repeated in closing that the policy considerations of New Jersey tort law
applaud the adoption of the Majestic dictum. 569 F.2d at 1214. The court specified that
applicability of its holding depended upon proof at trial that the subcontractor had been negligent, that he would be unable to respond in damages, and that the employer's failure to insist
on financial responsibility was an unreasonable violation of a trade practice. Id. at 1214-15. The
court stated that if such circumstances were proved, the employer would only be liable for the
difference between the insurance which is actually required and the amount reasonable in light
of trade practice. Id. at 1215.
63. 569 F.2d at 1215 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter placed importance on the incidental nature of the Majestic dictum and emphasized the fact that, in the 18 years since Majestic had been handed down, no New Jersey court had adopted-that court's dictum in considering
a case similar to Becker. Id. He further noted that other states have expressly chosen not to do
so. Id. at 1215-16 (Hunter, J., dissenting). The dissent thus considered the majority's holding to
be a bold mce for a federal court deciding a novel state court issue. Id. at 1216 (Hunter, J.,
dissenting). See note 46 supra.
64. 569 F.2d at 1216 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
65. Id. Judge Hunter also feared that the majority's decision would limit the opportunities
of new independent contractors who do not have much starting capital to enter the market. Id.
But see Morris, supra note 15, at 342-43 (an independent contractor who cannot meet his
financial obligations is better excluded from business).
66. 569 F.2d at 1216 (Hunter, J., dissenting). See note 8 supra. See also text accompanying
note 45 supra. The dissent interpreted the enactment of the Construction Safety Act and the
Employers' Liability Insurance Law as indicative of a desire on the part of the New Jersey state
legislature to regulate the duties of care imposed on those engaged in construction work. 569
F.2d at 1216 (Hunter, J., dissenting). See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
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It is submitted that though the Becker court's purpose of compensating
innocent plaintiffs is laudable, 6 7 its methodology in effectuating that purpose
is subject to criticism. Initially, there are doctrinal difficulties with the Third
Circuit's prediction of the way in which a New Jersey court would have
decided the issue presented. Although it seems that the Becker court has
certainly acted within its power in reaching its decision 6 it is submitted
that, as a matter of jurisprudential policy, a federal court sitting in diversity
should be reluctant to affirmatively create unprecedented state case law unless prior state court decisions and other state law overwhelmingly suggest
such a result. 69 The Becker court, in imposing an unprecedented tort duty,
relied mainly on policy considerations that apply to all tort law 70 and its own
7
interpretation of the legislative intent underlying two New Jersey statutes. 1
It is suggested that the above considerations of policy and legislative intent
do not compellingly indicate that a New Jersey state court would have im72
posed a new tort duty in this instance.
Secondly, the court's failure to define certain terms contained within its
holding leaves many unresolved questions. For example, the court fails to
delineate the line between a more than modestly financed employer and a
modestly financed employer. 73 Criteria to determine extensive as opposed
to limited business experience were not promulgated, 74 and no standards
were provided to ascertain the necessary amount of insurance coverage pur-

More specifically, the dissent viewed the legislature as having already implemented a policy of financial protection for workers on construction sites in promulgating the Employers'
Liability Insurance Law..569 F.2d at 1216 (Hunter, J., dissenting). For this reason, the dissent
was "unwilling to predict" that the New Jersey courts would require additional insurance
beyond workmen's compensation. Id.
67. See Comment, Responsibility for the Torts of An Independent Contractor, 39 YALE L.J.
861, 871-73 (1930) (a "desire to assure certainty of compensation to the injured party" is at the
root of the exceptions to the general contractor rule).
68. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
69. Among the factors that have traditionally been considered important in the resolution of
federal-state conflict of laws questions in diversity situations are the promotion of uniformity
and predictability of substantive law within a state, and the policy of comity reflected by the
doctrine of federalism. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74, 78-80 (1938); Note, 16 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 852, 865 (1975). See also Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347, 350 (1976) (federal court application of state law
invites conflict between two systems-"intrusion" into state courts); Comment, 22 J. PUB. L.
439, 445 (1973) (advocating abstention where unsettled state law is at issue; avoids "embarrassment" from incorrectly "guessing" how state court would decide; strengthens federalism). For a
federal court to impose an unprecedented tort duty is contrary to the concepts of federalism and
uniformity, and may well be a futile gesture, as the New Jersey Supreme Court can ignore or
curtail the decision, although it cannot overrule it. Additionally, it is suggested that the lack of
uniformity potentially resulting from this decision and the fact that the issue has been decided
by a federal court but is undecided in New Jersey promote forum shopping, an undesirable
result. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
70. 569 F.2d at 1209-12. See W. PROSSEn, supra note 12, at 14-23 (discussing the policies
underlying tort law).
71. 569 F.2d at 1212. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 59-61 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
73. See 569 F.2d at 1213.
74. Id.
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suant to trade practice in an industry. 75 In light of these remaining uncertainties, it is submitted that there is merit in the dissent's contention that
the imposition of a new tort duty in this area of employer immunity is best
76
left to the legislature.
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit in Becker has provided increased protection to the often helpless worker by slightly extending an employer's tort
liability. It is suggested that such a result is commendable since a subcontractor who cannot pay for personal injuries occurring during the operation
of a business should not engage in that business. 77 The immediate impact
of Becker, however, may well be minimal. Those engaged in the industries
to which the decision applies already carry liability insurance policies as a
matter of trade practice. 78 Becker will thus compel employees to comply
with extant trade practices.
It is possible, however, that the rule enunciated may not be as narrow
as anticipated by the Becker court. The confusion surrounding the standard
established 79 may present an employer in the middle range of financial
wealth and business experience with the problem of determining whether he
could conceivably be liable under Becker. In light of this uncertainty, it is
submitted that some employers in this middle range, not intended to be
included by the Becker court, may arguably feel pressured to heed the
court's mandates for fear of liability.
In conclusion, in imposing the new tort duty, the Third Circuit
achieved the laudable objective of making greater compensation available for
the tort victim in this instance.8 0 It is suggested that the Third Circuit has
created confusion in this area of employer immunity, however, since it is
uncertain how the terms "well-financed" and "experienced" will be subsequently interpreted when applied. 8 ' Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court will ultimately determine the impact of Becker on New Jersey
82
tort law.
Ellen C. Mecklenborg

75. Id. at 1216-17 (Hunter, J., dissenting). See note 8 supra. See also text accompanying
note 45 supra.
76. See note 66 supra.
77. See 569 F.2d at 1215.
78. See id. at 1216 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
79. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
80. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
81. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
82. See note 46 supra.
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OF TORTS-WHEN MORE THAN ONE MANUFACTURER HAS CONTRIBUTED
SUBSTANTIALLY TO MANUFACTURE OF PRODUCT, RESPONSIBILITY FOR
FAILURE TO INSTALL SAFETY DEVICES IS TO BE DETERMINED BY EXAMINING TRADE CUSTOM, RELATIVE EXPERTISE OF MANUFACTURERS,
"AND PRACTICALITY OF INSTALLATION AT EACH STAGE OF MANUFACTURE.

Verge v. Ford Motor Co. (1978)
Plaintiff Jesus Garcia Verge, a member of a garbage collection crew,'
was standing behind a garbage truck when a co-worker placed a full can of
garbage approximately three feet to his rear. 2 When the driver of the truck
shifted into reverse gear and moved backwards without warning,3 Verge was
4
pinned between the truck and the garbage can and suffered a broken leg.
Thereupon Verge filed a strict liability action, 5 naming as defendants
7
the Ford Motor Company (Ford), 6 which manufactured the cab and chassis,
and the Leach Company (Leach) and the Elgin-Leach Corporation (ElginLeach), 8 the manufacturer and assembler of the compactor unit. 9 The complaint was based on the defendants' alleged failure to equip the vehicle with
mirrors or other devices which would allow a driver to check behind the
vehicle before reversing, or with any device which would warn someone
behind the truck that it was about to be reversed. 10
1. Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 1978). Verge, an employee of the
Department of Public Works of the Government of the Virgin Islands, had worked on the
garbage collection crew for approximately eight years. Brief for Appellant at 2, Verge v. Ford
Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978), citing Transcript at 64-65, Verge v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 75-130 (D.V.I. 1975).
2. 581 F.2d at 385.
3. Id. The driver had not received any signal to proceed and had not checked the location
of Verge or the other crew members before moving the truck. Id.
4. id.
5. Id. at 385-86. The action also alleged negligence. Id. Verge's complaint stated:
[H]is injuries were caused by the defendants in that they:
(a) Designed, manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold the garbage truck in an
unsafe condition.
(b) Designed, manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold the garbage truck in a
condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use.
(c) Failed to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design of the
garbage truck, which failure made the truck dangerous for the purposes for which it was
manufactured.
id.
6. Id. at 385.
7. Id. at 386.
8. Id. at 385.
9. Id. at 388. Also named as defendants were Isla Verde Sales, Inc., and the John Doe
Corporation. Id. at 385. Apparently these two named parties were not brought into the action.
Id. at 386.
The Verge opinion does not clearly state which of the other two corporate defendants involved in this case, Leach and Elgin-Leach, was the manufacturer of the compactor unit and
which was the installer of the unit on the cab and chassis.
10. Id. at 386. The allegation as to the warning device was couched in terms of failure to
warn Verge "and other persons foreseeably similarly situated." Id. for a discussion of the
element of foreseeability, see notes 36-41 and accompanying text infra.

(406)
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Elgin-Leach and Leach settled with Verge before trial." Verge proceeded against Ford, however, alleging defective design of the garbage
truck1 2 under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (section
402A or Restatement). 13 After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Verge,
4
Ford moved for judgment n.o.v.1
Appealing from the district court's denial of this motion, 15 Ford argued
that Verge had failed to present a prima facie case under section 402A1 6 on
the basis that the truck as sold by Ford was not in a defective condition, but
only became unsafe, if at all, upon addition by Leach of the garbage compactor unit. 1 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit' 8 reversed, holding that under the facts of the case Ford was not legally responsible for the design defect. Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir.
1978).
The doctrine of strict liability in tort' 9 was first applied to a products
liability case by the Supreme Court of California in its landmark decision in
11. 581 F.2d at 386. The settlement consisted of a $10,000 cash payment as well as plaintiff's specific reservation of the right to proceed against Ford. Brief for Appellant at 3, Verge v.
Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978).
12. 581 F.2d at 385-86.
13. Id. at 386. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

The Virgin Islands rules of decision act provides in pertinent part:
The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the law approved
by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the
Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws to the contrary.
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (1957). See also Skeoch v. Ottley, 377 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1967)
(Virgin Islands law, absent contrary local law or statute, incorporates the principles enunciated
in Restatements of law approved by the American Law Institute).
Research reveals no Virgin Islands statutory law concerning products liability.
14. 581 F.2d at 386. The amount of the verdict was $75,000. Id.
15. id.
16. Brief for Appellant at 1, Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978). Ford
further argued that the district court's failure to submit the issue of assumption of risk to the
jury as well as its failure to submit to the jury special interrogatories on the comparative responsibility of each defendant constituted error. 581 F.2d at 389 n.7.
17. Brief for Appellant at 10, Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978).
18. The case was heard by Judges Gibbons, Garth, and Higginbotham. The opinion was
written by Judge Higginbotham.
19. The doctrine of strict liability in tort "is not the only theory upon which a supplier's
strict liability can be predicated. Liability for breach of warranty is also strict, insofar as no
element of fault is involved." L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[1]
(1977 insert) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN].
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Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 0 Basing its decision upon the
policy of requiring manufacturers to compensate those injured by the manufacturers' defective products, 2 1 the Greenman court held the manufacturer
liable "when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 22 Shortly after deciding Greenman, the Supreme
Court of California's decision in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. 23 extended
that rule by imposing liability upon the manufacturer of a completed product
notwithstanding proof that a third party responsible for an intermediate step
24
of manufacturing may have caused the defect.
The final form of section 402A z5 recognized the new wave of tort law
represented by Greenman. Under that section, liability is generally im20. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Greenman involved a combination power tool which was given to the plaintiff by his wife, who had purchased it from a
retailer. Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. While the plaintiff was using the
machine as a wood lathe, the piece of wood being turned flew out of the lathe and struck him,
inflicting serious injuries. Id. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant-manufacturer. Id. at 64, 377
P.2d at 902, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 702. In so doing the court held that the manufacturer was liable to
the plaintiff although there was no contractual privity. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
at 701.
Prior to Greenman, liability under warranty law was "strict" in that a showing of negligence
was not required; plaintiff only had to show defect, injury, causal connection, and the contractual privity giving rise to the warranty. See, e.g., Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
185 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1962) (concepts of negligence and fault have no place in warranty cases;
plaintiff need only show that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's possession, and that this defect caused the injury); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (in case sounding in implied warranty, recovery of damages does not
depend upon proof of negligence). See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19,
§ 16.01[1].
21. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The Greenman court stated that
"[t]he purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Id.
Professor Prosser has identified several more specific bases supporting this broad, risk
spreading rationale, such as
the public interest in the utmost safety of products, the demand for the maximum protection of the consumer, the implied assurance in placing the goods on the market for use,
the consumer's reliance on the apparent safety of the product, the fact that the consumer
is the seller's ultimate objective, [and] the desirability of avoiding circuity of action and
allowing direct recovery against earlier sellers.
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 816
(1966).
22. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
23. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). The plaintiff in Vandermark was
injured when he lost control of his six-week old Ford automobile on the freeway and it collided
with a light standard off the shoulder of the highway. Id. at 259, 391 P.2d at 169, 37 Cal. Rptr.
at 897. Vandermark brought suit against Ford Motor Company, the manufacturer of the car,
alleging that a defect in the car had caused the accident. Id. at 258, 391 P.2d at 169, 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 897. The trial court granted Ford's motion for nonsuit and entered judgment thereon.
Id. at 258, 391 P.2d at 169, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 897. The Supreme Court of California reversed. Id.
at 264, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
24. Id. at 261, 391 P.2d at 170-71, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 898-99. According to the Vandermark
court, rules imposing liability on the manufacturer of the completed product for defects,
whether negligently or nonnegligently caused, "apply regardless of what part of the manufacturing process the manufacturer chooses to delegate to third parties." Id.
25. For the text of § 402A, see note 13 supra.
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posed 2 6 upon the seller 2 7 of a product 2 8 which is unreasonably dangerous 2 9
and in a defective condition,3 0 and which reaches the ultimate user or con26. Liability based upon § 402A is most often imposed in cases involving personal injuries,
but the provision has been held to extend to wrongful death actions, property damage, and, in a
few cases, even to economic loss. See, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d
228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968) (wrongful death); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113
(Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967) (property damage); Rosenau v. City of New
Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968) (property damage); Burbage v. Boiler Eng'r &
Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969) (wrongful death); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220
A.2d 853 (1966) (personal injury); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257
A.2d 676 (1969) (property damage to the product itself); Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d
25 (Tex Ct. App. 1970) (economic loss); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d
729 (1969) (personal injury). For a discussion of the types of damages falling within the purview
of § 402A, see generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 16A[4][k]; R. HURSH & H.
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2D §§ 4:18-22 (1974 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HURSH & BAILEY].
27. While the text of § 402A begins "[one who sells any product," a later qualification
limits this expansive rule to a seller "engaged in the business .of selling such a product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(a) (1965). Comment f to § 402A indicates that the
term "seller" "applies to any manufacturer of such a product, [and] to any wholesale or retail
dealer or distributor." Id. comment f.
Utilizing the text of § 402A as a starting point, courts applying the section have developed a
body of law concerning the scope of the word "seller." See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (manufacturer);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (manufacturer); Texaco, Inc.
v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969) (supplier); Cooley v.
Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 1974) (supplier); Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 A.D. 2d
344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1974) (manufacturer); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966)
(distributor); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (distributor); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of America, 11 Wash. App. 929, 525 P.2d 286 (1974), aff'd, 86 Wash.
2d 145, 542 P.2ct 774 (1975) (distributor and retailer). For a fuller discussion of persons subject
to liability under § 402A, see generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 16A[4][b];
HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 26, at §§ 4:26-30.
28. Although the term "product" is critical to the application of § 402A, it is not well defined. Nevertheless, the comments to the Restatement provide that the "product" includes the
container as well as its contents. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965).
For example, a manufacturer would be liable for injury caused by an exploding carbonated
beverage bottle as well as for injury caused by contamination of the beverage. Id.
"Product" within the meaning of § 402A may refer to something which has been processed
before it reaches the ultimate user or consumer, as well as something which has undergone no
such processing. Id. comment e. "Thus the supplier of poisonous mushrooms which are neither
cooked, canned, packaged, nor otherwise treated is subject to the liability here stated." Id. See
Maloney, What is or is Not a Product Within the Meaning of Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L. REV.
625 (1974).
29. Comment i to § 402A illuminates this rather murky concept. This comment provides:
"The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965). The
draftsmen emphasized the "ordinary consumer" standard in their examples: whiskey otherwise
not contaminated is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it is dangerous to alcoholics;
similarly, butter is not unreasonably dangerous, even though its use allegedly increases risk of
heart attack for some people. Id.
30. The requirement in § 402A of a "defective" condition is not explained beyond the inclusion of several examples of types of defects which will support an action under the section.
According to the comments to § 402A, "harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product
itself either as to presence or quantity, . . .foreign objects contained in the product, . . . decay
or deterioration [of the product] before sale, or . . .the way in which the product is prepared
or packed" each satisfies the "defective" condition requirement. Id. comment h. Additionally,
failure to adequately warn the ultimate user or consumer of a potential danger in the product,
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sumer 3 1 without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 32
Such liability attaches even though the seller exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of the product.3" It is noted in the caveat to section 402A that the drafters of the Restatement refrained from deciding the
when the user or consumer would not ordinarily be aware of the danger, might constitute a
defect. Id. comment j.
Neither § 402A, its caveats, nor the accompanying comments'provide a definition of "defective condition." As astute an observer as Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the Supreme Court
of California, the author of the majority opinions in both Greenman and Vandermark, wrote
that "defect" may be defined in a number of ways, and that as of the time of his writing, "no
definition has been formulated that would resolve all cases." Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965). The current
plethora of criteria or tests for determining a defective condition supports the continued vitality
of Chief Justice Traynor's observation. See, e.g., Brizendine v. Visador Co., 305 F. Supp. 157
(D. Or. 1969), aff'd, 437 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1970) (use of material which may not be safely used
for the purpose intended); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247
N.E.2d 401 (1969) (product failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light
of its nature and intended function); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d
64 (1970) (a defect is any condition not contemplated by the user which makes the product
unreasonably dangerous to him); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201
(1969) (failure to meet the reasonable expectations of the user); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co.,
214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969) (product malfunction); Degen v. Bayman,_
S.D.-,
241 N.W.2d 703 (1976) (failure to warn).
For a comprehensive discussion of the meaning of "defective condition," including a review
of the criteria of several other commentators, see Montgomery & Owen, Reflections of the
Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S. C. L. REV.
803, 810-11, 814-17, 818-22 (1976).
31. The caveat to § 402A notes that no opinion is expressed as to the applicability of the
section to harm to persons other than "users or consumers." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, caveat (1965).
Although § 402A provides no definition of "users or consumers," comment I provides some
guidance as to the parties in whom the cause of action established by § 402A is vested:
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not necessary that the
ultimate user or consumer have acquired the product directly from the seller, although
the rule applies equally if he does so. He may have acquired it through one or more
intermediate dealers. It is not even necessary that the consumer have purchased the
product at all. He may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee,
or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser. The liability stated is one in
tort, and does not require any contractual relation, or privity of contract, between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
0
Id. comment 1.
For court decisions interpreting the class of potential plaintiffs, see, e.g., Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 I11.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (bus passenger); Allen v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 403 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1966) (purchaser); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974) (user of product); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (relative of
purchaser); McKisson v. Sales Aflliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (user of free advertising sample); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (user or consumer);
Helicoid Gage Div. of American Chain and Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1974) (employee of purchaser). See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, §
16A[41[c]; HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 26, §§ 4:23-25.
32. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A(1)(b) provides that, in
addition to the requirements of the other elements of strict product liability, the product must
be "expected to and ... [actually] reach the ultimate user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold." Id. § 402A(1)(b). On the matter of substantial
change, see notes 36-41 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the effect of a defect
or change occurring after the product leaves the hands of the manufacturer or seller, see HURSH
& BAILEY, supra note 26, § 4:16; Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972) (discussing subsequent
alteration of product).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
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question of the liability of a seller when the product is expected to and does
undergo substantial change before it reaches the ultimate user or consumer,3 4 and of a seller of a component part to be assembled into a final
product.35
Since there is some question as to the effect of a "substantial change,"
courts applying section 402A to cases involving some degree of alteration of
the product have turned to familiar tort concepts in developing a workable
framework for legal analysis. 36 Although "foreseeability," which is required

34. Id. § 402A, caveat.
35. Id., comment q. This comment, specifically addressed to the caveat referred to in the
text accompanying note 34 supra, draws a parallel between a component part to be simply
incorporated into something larger and a product which is expected to and does undergo substantial change or processing before reaching the user or consumer. Id. As the Restatfment
noted:
The same [as in the case of further processing or substantial change] problem arises
in cases of the sale of a component part of a product to be assembled by another. . . . It
is no doubt to be expected that where there is no change in the component part itself,
but it is merely incorporated into something larger, the strict liability will be found to
carry through to the ultimate user or consumer.
Id.
36. When an element of product alteration arises in a § 402A case, the court is often able to
avoid the question of whether the alteration is so substantial as to remove the action from the
scope of § 402A by deciding the case on the basis of another tort concept. See Dennis v. Ford Motor
Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding Ford's reliance on "substantial change" language in
§ 402A to be misplaced and considering the question as one of proximate cause); Southwire Co.
v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (proximate cause); Thompson v. Package
Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971) (foreseeability); Finnegan v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972) (proximate cause). See Balido v. Improved Mach.,
Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972) (foreseeability and proximate cause). Cf.
Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)
(where misuse of machine was foreseen by manufacturer, such party could not raise affirmative
defense of misuse of product); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972)
(since manufacturer of machine could reasonably foresee that purchaser-user would not install a
safety device, the latter's nonalteration would not defeat liability); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r
Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351 A.2d 22 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 76 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d
816 (1978) (manufacturer not held responsible in absence of evidence that the misuse was foreseeable.).
Liability will not be imposed under § 402A where it is shown that an alteration, whether or
not "substantial" within the meaning of § 402A, has acted as an intervening superseding
cause-where the alteration, rather than any alleged defect caused by the manufacturer, is the
proximate cause of the injury. See, e.g., Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir.
1973); Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Finnegan v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972). In Southwire, the defendant proved that the
alteration which the plaintiff's employer had made on the product, rather than any inherent
defect in the product, was the proximate cause of the accident. 370 F. Supp. at 858. In entering
judgment for the defendant, the court inferred from prior cases that a plaintiff's failure to negate evidence of substantial change "is the same as saying that they failed to prove proximate
cause, since . . . [he] failed to negate the break in the causal connection between the original
defect and the ultimate injury." Id. at 857. It was suggested in Southwire that a "substantial
change" within the meaning of § 402A "may well be . . . something less significant than an
intervening superseding cause." Id. n.21.
See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 535 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976), in which the
court upheld the judgment against the defendant-manufacturer under § 402A. Id. at 891. Although the jury found that the plaintiff's misuse of the product was only one producing cause of
the occurrence, "and failed to find that such misuse was the sole producing cause, its finding of
misuse does not . . . preclude . . . [plaintiff's] recovery." Id. at 889-90.
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in the law of negligence, 37 is not expressly included in section 402A, some
courts have imputed a foreseeability element into the 402A cause of action to
deal with the "substantial change" problem. 38 In Capasso v. Minster
Machine Co., 39 for instance, the Third Circuit 40 interpreted the meaning of
"'change" in section 402A(1)(b) as being a limitation "designed to protect the
maker from liability for uses not reasonably contemplated and for which he
could not therefore take safety measures. ' 41 The court thus implicitly established a requirement of foreseeability of uses or changes in the product.
Additionally, the courts applying section 402A have generally held both
defects in manufacture and defects in design to fall within the scope of the
term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." 42 In Pike v. Frank G.
Hough Co. ,4 for example, the Supreme Court of California decided that a
cause of action in strict liability might be based upon a defect in design
rather than upon a traditional defect in manufacture. 4 Finding that a jury
37.,See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, §§ 5.03, 8.03[1]-[3], 11.02, 15.01.03; HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 26, §§ 8:7,11-12,33; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 16.12, 20.5 (1956 & Supp. 1968); W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS §§ 31, 43 (4th ed.
1971).
38. In Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971), the
plaintiff instituted suit under § 402A against the manufacturer of a plastic molding machine for
design defects which allegedly caused her injuries. Id. at 190, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 282. Defendant's
theory, upon which the trial judge refused to instruct the jury, was that the safety gate designed
to protect an operator's hands, if dangerous at all, became so only because of a modification
made after the machine had left the factory. Id. at 191, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 283. The California
Court of Appeals held erroneous the trial judge's instruction that the jury could not find the
defendant liable if the jury found that "the cause of the accident and injury was due to an
alteration in the machine as it was manufactured." Id. at 195, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86. Finding
for the plaintiff, the court held that "a manufacturer may be held liable where the alteration of
the machine .. .was reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 196, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 286. Accord, Dennis
v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973). See
also Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 16A[4][d]; HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 26, § 4:16.
39. 532 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1976), noted in the Third Circuit Review, 22 VILL. L. REV. 885
(1976). Capasso involved an appeal by the plaintiff from a directed verdict for defendant. 532
F.2d at 953. In overturning the directed verdict, the court held, inter alia, that a jury question
had arisen as to whether the defendant-manufacturer could have foreseen that the particular
modification would have been made by the purchaser, who was the employer of the injured
plaintiff. Id. at 955. "[W]e think it was for the jury to decide whether the changes, substantial
or not, were even of the type contemplated by § 402A(1)(b)." Id.
40. Chief Judge Seitz wrote the opinion. The case was also heard by Judges Van Dusen and
Weis.
41. 532 F.2d at 955 (footnote omitted).
42. See, e.g., Schreffler v. Birdsboro Corp., 490 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1974) (design defect);
Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (design
defect); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 I11.
2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969)
(manufacturing defect); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970) (manufacturing defect); Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 A.D.2d 289, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1973) (manufacturing defect).
43. 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (en bane).
44. Id. at 475, 467 P.2d at 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636. In Pike, plaintiffs appealed from a
judgment entered upon the granting of defendant's motion for nonsuit. Id. at 469, 467 P.2d at
231, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The plaintiffs in this wrongful death action, the widow and children of
a road construction worker who was killed when a huge "Paydozer" earth mover reversed and
backed over him, asserted strict liability of the defendant based on the faulty design of the
Paydozer, which had a substantial blind spot to the rear of the vehicle. Id. at 468-69, 467 P.2d
at 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
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might reasonably have concluded that the substantial "blind spot" behind a
huge earth moving vehicle rendered the product unsafe for its intended use,
the Pike court stated that "there is no rational distinction between design
and manufacture in . . . [strict liability in tort], since a product may be

equally defective and dangerous if its design subjects protected persons to
unreasonable risk as if its manufacture does so." 45 Both the common law of
strict liability in tort and section 402A have been the basis for many other
46
decisions embracing the same view.
In the instant case, the Third Circuit began its consideration of Ford's
appeal by examining the plaintiff's central allegation that the Ford truck was
defective when it left Ford's hands because it did not have a device which
would provide an audible warning when the truck was put into reverse
gear. 47 The court viewed this contention as presenting two' primary issues:
1) whether a defect in fact existed; and 2) on whom the responsibility, if any,
should be placed. 48 The Verge court noted that since the jury had found for
the plaintiff, the existence of a defect was necessarily established. 49 " Thereupon the court considered "whether the responsibility for installing such a
device should be placed solely upon the company that manufactured the cab
and chassis, or solely upon the company who modified the chassis by adding
0
the compactor unit or upon both." 5
51
In addressing this "little-litigated subtlety of products liability law,"
the Verge court felt bound to proceed according to a realistic view of trade
relations 52 and to impose liability'only "where the manufacturer is responsi45. Id. at 475, 467 P.2d at 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
46. See, e.g., Schreffler v. Birdsboro Corp., 490 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1974) (no distinction
made between defect in product and defect in design); linicki v. Montgomery Ward Co., 371
F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966) (failure of design to include certain safety features raised a jury question of defectiveness in a strict liability action); Green v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d
819, 115 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1974) (defect in design is sufficient to support liability under § 402A);
Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (in ruling upon defendant's motions equating "dangerous condition" with "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" in a § 402A case, failure of the design to include a safety factor constituted a jury question
as to the existence of a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"); Berkebile v. Brantly
Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) ("defective condition" included both defects
of design and defects of manufacture). Cf. Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283
A.2d 255 (1971) (in adopting strict liability rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court
accepted both the concepts of defect in manufacture and defect in design). See generally
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 16A[4][f][iv]; HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 26, § 9:16.
47. 581 F.2d at 386. The Third Circuit quoted the plaintiff's complaint, which was based
upon the defendant's failure to equip the truck with mirrors which would enable the driver to
ascertain the presence of individuals behind the truck and the failure to equip the truck with
warning devices. id. There was no further discussion, however, of the mirror omission issue.
See note 80 infra.
48. 581 F.2d at 386.
49. Id. The defect was established as to the garbage truck. Id. It is suggested that a distinction between the completed garbage truck and the cab and chassis without the compactor unit
is critical to a proper allocation of legal responsibility. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text
infra.
50. 581 F.2d at 386 (footnote omitted). Although the court suggested that responsibility for
the defect might be imposed on either company or both, it did not consider the possibility of
holding both parties responsible. See notes 79-82 and accompanying text infra.
51. 581 F.2d at 385.
52. Id. at 387, quoting Schipper v. Levitt, 44 N.J. 70, 99, 207 A.2d 314, 330 (1965).
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ble for the defective conditions." 5 3 The Third Circuit thus identified three
criteria for assigning responsibility for the absence of a safety device when
54
more than one party substantially contributed to the finished product.
These factors were: 1) trade custom; 2) relative expertise of the manufacturers; and 3) practicality of installing a safety device at each stage of manufacture. 55 The court then proceeded to scrutinize the evidence at trial in light
56
of these three determinative factors.
The court first attempted to determine whether there was an established trade custom which dictated whether the manufacturer of the cab and
chassis or the installer of the compactor unit should have installed the warning device. 57 Finding the record of the trial on this point to be weak, the
Verge court concluded that no persuasive evidence of trade custom had been
58
established.
A comparison of the levels of expertise in the design problems and rel59
evant safety techniques possessed by Ford and Leach was then made.
Drawing upon the testimony adduced at trial, the Third Circuit noted a
disparity between the respective levels of expertise; Leach, dealing almost
exclusively in garbage compactor units, had installed thousands of units over
the years, while no testimony was produced to indicate that Ford had any
expertise in the design of garbage collection vehicles. 60 The court thus
found that "the evidence indicates that Leach is considerably more expert in
61
the design of garbage trucks than is Ford."
The application of the "practicality" factor involved a determination of
the stage of the manufacturing process at which the installation of a safety
device would be most feasible. 62 The court noted in connection herewith
that the plaintiff's own expert had testified to the multipurpose nature of the
Ford cab and chassis. 63 Since the Ford frame could be adapted to a
number of uses which would not require a backup warning buzzer, while
Leach's modification was one with which Leach had decades of experience,
the court considered it "much more practical for Leach to install the warning
64
device."

53. 581 F.2d at 386, quoting Taylor v. Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 516 F.2d 145, 147 (3d Cir.
1975).
54. 581 F.2d at 386-87. It is suggested that the instant factual situations-where more than
one party makes a substantial contribution to the finished product-differs factually from the
usual case in which one party merely provides a component which is integrated into the
finished product by the manufacturer making the greatest contribution in assembling the product.
55. Id. at 387.
56. Id. at 387-89.
57. Id. at 387-88.
58. Id. at 388. It should be noted that since trade custom was not an issue at trial, the weak
evidentiary record was not necessarily a function of the nonexistence of evidence.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 388-89.
63. Id. at 388.
64. Id. at 389.
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Under the facts of the case, which were not disputed, the Verge court
thus determined that the plaintiff had failed to prove that it was incumbent
upon Ford to install warning devices on all its vehicles. 65 Accordingly, the
Third Circuit held that Ford was not legally responsible for injuries resulting
from the failure to include any safety device on the cab and chassis. 66 The
district court's denial of Ford's motion for judgment n.o.v. was reversed, and
67
the district court was instructed to grant the motion in favor of Ford.
Although the Third Circuit recognized that the issue involved the
"little-litigated subtlety" 68 of "on whom to place design responsibility where
69
a product has been manufactured and assembled in more than one stage,"
it is submitted that the court failed to utilize many of the analytical methods
of the law of products liability in reaching its decision.7 0 The court developed a set of dispositive factors which resolved the issue sub judice but
71
did not provide analytical clarity or guidance to courts in the future.
The Verge court gave little consideration to the "substantial change"
limitation of section 402A(1)(b). 7 2 Had the court discussed the modification
of the cab and chassis in terms of section 402A(1)(b), it could have built upon
this concept and its attendant case law to resolve the legal subtleties of the
instant case.7 3 Such analysis would have been apposite here because Verge
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 390.
68. Id. at 385. This subtlety might best be described as a "synergistic" theory of design
defects. The dictionary defines "synergism" as "the cooperative action of discrete agencies (such
as drugs or muscles) such that the total effect is greater than the sum of the two or more effects
taken independently." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged)
(1971). The design defect in the present case is "synergistic" in the sense that the danger
existed only when the cab and chassis and the garbage compactor unit were used in tandem.
A synergistic defect is distinguishable from the defect in the more common factual situation
involving two or more manufacturers in which a component element alone is defective. See
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963), in which the action, arising from an airplane crash, was brought against Kollsman, as the
manufacturer of the allegedly defective altimeter, as well as against Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the maker of the plane who assembled the altimeter into the completed plane. Id. at
435-37, 191 N.E.2d at 82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 593-95.
69. 581 F.2d at 385.
70. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra. In addition to the concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause, discussion ot the question of the theory of assumption of risk is germane. For a discussion of the viability of the defense of assumption of risk in a § 402A action,
see FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 16A[5][f]; HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 26, § 4:36.
On appeal, Ford had additionally argued that the district court's failure to submit to the
jury the issue of assumption of risk and failure to submit special interrogatories on the comparative responsibility of each defendant constituted error. 581 F.2d at 389 n.7. Because of its
disposition of Ford's appeal, the Third Circuit found it unnecessary to address these issues. Id.
71. The court did not attempt to justify its inclusion of these particular factors or explain
why these considerations were particularly compelling.
72. See 581 F.2d at 386 n.2. Having concluded that Ford did not know that the cab and
chassis in the present case were to be converted for refuse collection use, the court mentioned
in a footnote that "[w]e do not suggest that Ford could not foresee that its .. .chassis would be
converted for use as a garbage truck." Id. at 389 n.6 (emphasis added). The court continued:
"We emphasize only that Leach was in a much better position than Ford to incorporate the
safety features necessitated by spch a use." Id.
73. There exists adequate precedent for analyzing the modification of the cab and chassis in
terms of foreseeability. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that, on
remand, a jury might have found the present alteration reasonably foreseeable.
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presented a case of defect in design which remained inchoate until the garbage compactor was integrated with the cab and chassis. 74 Since the rear
vision was not obscured until the addition of the compactor unit, 7n it is submitted that the cab and chassis as a unit was not defective within the meaning of section 402A. 76 Under the general rule of section 402A, however, a
manufacturer would be liable even when substantial changes have been subsequently made to the product if those changes were foreseeable by the
manufacturer.77 Nevertheless, the Verge court did not discuss the possibility that the subsequent modifications of the cab and chassis were foreseeable.7s
Additionally, it is submitted that the court's analysis neglected to address the possibility of concurrent responsibility. 79 At trial the jury had
determined that the absence of a warning device rendered the garbage truck
unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of section 402A.8 0 The issue as
identified by the Third Circuit was whether Ford, Leach, or both, should be
held responsible for the design defect. 81 In applying its tipartite test to
resolve that issue, however, the court merely considered whether Ford or
82
Leach should be found liable.
74. 581 F.2d at 388. The court observed that if a flat bed allowing unobstructed rear vision
were added to the chassis, "it ... [would be] difficult to conceive of a legal basis for finding
that the absence of a warning device would constitute a design defect." Id. It is submitted that
the implication of this statement is that the cab and chassis without the compactor unit blocking
its rear vision did not contain a design defect. Only when the cab and chassis unit was fitted
with the compactor unit did the vehicle become defective.
75. Id. at 388-89.
76. Id. at 389. As the court stated, "we are dealing with a vehicle that was not inherently
defective when manufactured, but that became defective solely because of additions made by
...[Leach]." Id.
77. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
78. The court noted that "there is no direct evidence that Ford was ...aware that the ...
[cab and chassis] in question or any .. . [similar type of cab and chassis] would be used for
refuse collection." 581 F.2d at 389 (emphasis added). Qualifying this statement, the court
explained that "[we do not suggest that Ford could not foresee that its ... chassis would be
converted for use as a garbage truck." Id. at 389 n.6 (emphasis added). The court thus recognized the possibility that this particular use might have been foreseen by Ford, but either failed
to or chose not to discuss the legal ramifications of such foreseeability,
79. Consideration of joint liability of Ford and Leach/Elgin-Leach would have been more
compatible with th difficult problem of assigning legal liability for injury caused by a "synergistic" design defect. See note 68 supra.
80. 581 F.2d at 386. The court of appeals did not discuss the mirror omission issue despite
the fact that it quoted plaintiff's complaint alleging failure to equip the truck with mirrors which
would enable the driver to ascertain the presence of individuals behind the truck as well as the
failure to include a warning device. Id.Had the Third Circuit subjected the issue of responsibility for failure to install adequate mirrors on the truck to the same level of scrutiny under the
three Verge factors as it did the issue of responsibility for failure to install a warning sound
device, it might have reached a different conclusion because of the factual differences between
the respective installations.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 387-89. The opinion is devoid of any discussion concerning the possibility of holding both Ford and Leach liable. Additionally, the Third Circuit employed words of relativity
when testing the facts of the case under the three guiding Verge factors. In discussing the
"expertise" criterion, the court concluded that "Leach is more expert than Ford," rather
than
stating that each had substantial expertise. id. at 388. Thereupon the court concluded that "it is
considerably more practical" for Leach than for Ford to install the warning devices. Id. This
comparative approach suggests that the court was actually determining liability on an alternative
basis rather than considering each party's liability independently.
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The greatest impact of Verge will thus be found in its identification of
the problem of assigning responsibility for a defect in design when a product
has been substantially manufactured and assembled by more than one
party. 83 In the future, this issue will be more readily identifiable, and
courts confronting it will be better able to direct their energies toward de84
veloping a solution more consonant with existing section 402A law.
Furthermore, the courts have been more inclined of late to find joint liability where several defendants' acts have produced a single, indivisible
harm. 85 Were a factual situation similiar to that of Verge to arise in the
future, it is submitted that a finding of joint liability on the part of the
86
manufacturers would not be unlikely.
Francis X. O'Brien, Jr.
83. Research has not uncovered another case in which a defect resulted from the combination of the efforts of two manufacturers. Moreover, in Verge, the Third Circuit did not cite a
case involving a similiar factual situation.
84. Such a solution would probably require consideration of the foreseeability of the alteration or modification. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
85. W. PROSSER, supra note 37, § 47, at 295.
86. Professor Prosser has considered the situation in which acts, harmless in themselves,
cause damage when combined. If each defendant could raise the defense that his act alone was
harmless, the injured plaintiff would be precluded from recovery. Policy would thus favor holding multiple defendants liable in such a situation. See id. § 52, at 322. It is suggested that the
Verge court might have recognized the contributing roles of the two manufacturers of the garbage truck, and, balancing the equities, might have held them jointly responsible.
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